Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law
Scholarly Works

Faculty Scholarship

2000

Medical Malpractice: Treating the Causes Instead of the
Symptoms
David Orentlicher
University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Medical Jurisprudence
Commons

Recommended Citation
Orentlicher, David, "Medical Malpractice: Treating the Causes Instead of the Symptoms" (2000). Scholarly
Works. 1160.
https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub/1160

This Article is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional repository administered
by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact
youngwoo.ban@unlv.edu.

MEDICAL CARE

Volume 38, Number 3, pp 247-249
02000 Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, Inc.

Medical Malpractice
Treating the Causes Instead of the Symptoms

DAVID ORENTLICHER, MD, JD

The 2 reports on medical malpractice in (Utah
this and Colorado; see Table 2 in Reference 1),
month's issue deliver 2 messages.1'2 In their study
the likelihood of death from negligent care may

linking negligent care and malpractice claims,'
have declined substantially. In Califoria in 1974
and New York in 1984, 1 in 4 negligent events

Studdert et al found that for all of the academic

debate and legislative activity in the past 20 years, resulted in death (Reference 2 and Table 2.2 in

some things have not changed very much with Reference 4); in Colorado and Utah in 1992, 1 in 11
medical malpractice and the law. Eighteen years negligent events led to the patient's death.2
after landmark Califoria data and 8 years after
If the data on patient mortality were the only
equally important New York data, malpractice evidence of progress in malpractice, we could not
occurrence and malpractice claims data from Col- be confident in drawing conclusions. The better
orado and Utah in 1992 paint essentially the same results over time could simply reflect regional
picture as the earlier results: a small percentage ofvariation or empirical inaccuracy. The researchers
injured patients actually sue, and when claims are have been cautious about the significance of their

brought, a high percentage of them do not involvemortality data,2 and readers should also be careful

malpractice. In other words, the tort system in-not to put too much stock in the exact magnitude
cludes many false-positives (patients who sue in of the numbers from 1992 or earlier. Extrapolations
the absence of negligence) and even more falsefrom the New York study yielded an estimate of
negatives (patients who do not sue despite having
180,000 deaths each year in the United States from
been harmed by negligence).3 As a result, the law
all kinds of iatrogenic injury, whereas a similar
often subjects the wrong physicians to legal proextrapolation of the Colorado and Utah study
cess, it generally does not hold physicians acsuggests 65,000 deaths a year.2 (Extrapolating the
countable for their negligence, and it fails to
California data would yield an estimate of 150,000
ensure adequate compensation for injured padeaths a year.4(PP2o,22))

tients.l

Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to conclude

See p 250 and p 261

that little improvement has occurred. Recent shifts

in public policy suggest that we are witnessing a

In contrast, Thomas et al,2 from the same group welcome sea change in society's response to probof researchers, suggest considerable progress in lems in medical malpractice.

the second study in this issue. Although the
likelihood of negligent care appears to have been
fairly stable over time, ranging from 0.79% of
hospitalized patients in 1974 (California) to 1.00%
of hospitalized patients in 1984 (New York) to
0.90% and 0.80% of hospitalized patients in 1992
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Public policy used to emphasize reforms that

would protect physicians from the vagaries of the
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legislatures capped the amount of money that
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patients to bring their lawsuits within 2 or 3 years
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after suffering harm, and forced patients tophysicians,
file
thereby pushing insurance premiums to

their claims with medical review panels before
unaffordable levels and driving doctors out of highpursuing their claims in court.6

risk specialties like obstetrics and gynecology. In the

Public policy today emphasizes reforms popular
that
view, problems in malpractice would be
will protect patients from the vagaries ofsolved
the if it became more difficult for patients to sue
health care system. Indeed, in the final weeks
theirof
physicians.
1999, after the release of an Institute of Medicine
As the data accumulated, however, it became clear

report on medical negligence,7'8 President what
Clin-the Colorado and Utah experiences confirm:
ton,9 health care organizations,10 and largepatients
em- and their lawyers are not too likely to sue; if
ployers10 called for major efforts to reduce
the
anything,
they are too unlikely to sue. When physiincidence of medical malpractice.
cians face only a few percent chance of being
The focus is where it should be: on the causes

charged with malpractice,1,14 they may not be ade-

rather than the symptoms of negligence by phy- quately deterred from negligence. In addition, pa-

sicians. Experts in malpractice are drawing on tients are not being adequately compensated for

lessons from other industries to implementtheir injuries if only 2% or 3% of them bring claims.

changes in health care that will prevent unneces-And, as the studies demonstrate, many patients who
sary harms. For example, attention to system-widehave the greatest need for compensation-the indidefects instead of to the practices of individualgent-are the least likely to sue.1,15
practitioners has led to important changes.2,1
With better data, then, it became clear that the
Computer programs now flag dangerous interac-problem with malpractice was not in its litigation.
tions among different drugs taken by a patient,
The primary need is to reduce the frequency of
and they identify situations when the planned
malpractice, not to reduce the frequency of lawdose seems inappropriately high.12 Having physisuits. Although different studies have yielded difcians type, rather than write, their prescriptions
ferent rates of negligence and different rates of
reduces the likelihood that the pharmacy will
mortality from negligence,2'7 they all indicate that
deliver the wrong drug to the patient. Systems
medical malpractice is a leading cause of illness
reforms also include procedures to prevent physi-and death in the United States.7
cians from operating on the wrong patient or the
Important advances have already occurred in
wrong part of the body.
the medical profession's efforts to prevent the
The change in focus is a welcome shift from
occurrence of malpractice. As mentioned, proceunproductive and unfair criticisms of patients and
dures have been implemented to reduce adverse
their attorneys. Although it is likely true that most
events from the use of prescription drugs. In
lawsuits are filed in the absence of negligence,1,"3
addition, the development of specific and detailed
that fact probably reflects the relatively low rate of
standards for patient monitoring during surgery
negligence, not the arbitrariness of personal injury
has apparently contributed to reductions in the
lawyers.5 The following example will illustrate.
number of severe injuries from the maladministraProbably no more than 1 in 10 people who come
to a lawyer because of suspected malpractice aretion of general anesthesia.16 There is, then, good
reason to conclude that the improvements in data
actually harmed by negligent care (personal communication with Michael S. Miller, JD, Miller, are at least in part real.
Muller, Mendelson & Kennedy, Indianapolis, Ind, We might also consider whether some of the
January 4, 2000). If lawyers are accurate 90% of the improvement reflects greater efforts at cost contain-

ment. As insurers have restricted reimbursement,
time in distinguishing cases of negligence from
cases in which negligence was not involved (ie, hospitalization rates have declined, and patients are
90% sensitivity and 90% specificity), then half of being discharged more quickly. Fewer admissions

all malpractice suits will be based on cases inand fewer days once admitted mean fewer opportu-

which no negligence took place.

nities for iatrogenic injury. If physicians reduce un-

The critical change in focus from the symptoms tonecessary admissions, for example, patients are
the causes of malpractice could not have occurredspared unnecessary procedures. To be sure, cutbacks

without research like that presented in this issue.1,2 on hospital care may jeopardize patient care, but the
During the 1970s and 1980s, most people shared thestudies in this issue took into account negligent care

perception that ambulance-chasing lawyers and liti-that occurred before the patient's admission to the
gious patients were harassing competent and careful hospital,2 and other studies do not provide much
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O'Connell J, Pohl C. How reliable is medical
support for the view that cost containment 3.
has
worsened the quality of care.17

malpractice law? A review of "Medical Malpractice an

the on
American Jury: Confronting the Myths about Jur
Where do we go from here? Continued focus
Incompetence, Deep Pockets, and Outrageous Damage
preventing malpractice is the most important polAwards" by Neil Vidmar. J Law & Health 1997-98
icy. Patient welfare is the ultimate goal, and
the
12:359-379.
interests of patients and physicians alike will be
4. Danzon PM. Medical Malpractice: Theory, Evibest served if patients escape harm. One of the
dence, and Public Policy. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
studies in this issue demonstrates again the areas
University Press; 1985.

where the most harm occurs from negligence:
5. Saks MJ. Medical malpractice: facing real probsurgery and other procedures, drug administra-

lems and finding real solutions. William & Mary Law Rev

tion, and faulty diagnoses by primary care provid1994;35:693-726.
ers.2 Preventive measures should emphasize those
areas, as they already have to a large extent. 6. Kinney ED, Gronfein WP. Indiana's malpractice
system: no-fault by accident. Law Contemp Problems
As to additional reforms of tort law, it is difficult to
1991;54:169-193.

be optimistic. The most promising reforms, those
7. Committee on Quality of Health Care in America,
that would ensure better compensation of injured
Institute of Medicine. To Err Is Human: Building a Safer
patients, have commanded little political support.1
Health System. Washington, DC: National Academy

Alternative reforms, those that would further impede
Press; 1999.
patient access to the courts, may be more popular in

8. Pear R. Group asking U.S. for new vigilance in
state legislatures. However, they would only exacerpatient safety. New York Times November 30, 1999:A1.

bate the existing problems of physicians receiving

9. Pear R. A Clinton order seeks to reduce medical

weak signals of deterrence from the legal system and

errors. New York Times December 7, 1999:A1.

patients having trouble recovering compensation for

10. Kilborn PT. Ambitious effort to cut mistakes in

their injuries. Diluting the deterrence of tort law

New York Times December 26, 1999;sect
would be especially troublesome in the current U.S.
era hospitals.
of
1:1.

managed care. When physicians practiced under

11. Leape LL. Error in medicine. JAMA 1994;272:
fee-for-service reimbursement, tort liability arguably
1851-1857.

aggravated the financial incentive to provide too
12. Bates DW, Cullen D, Laird N, Petersen LA,
much care by inducing defensive medicine. Under
Small SD, Servi D, et al. Incidence of adverse drug
managed care, financial incentives encourage physi-

events
cians to provide too little care, so tort liability
canand potential adverse drug events: implications
for
prevention. JAMA 1995;274:29-34.
help ensure that physicians do not respond to their
13. Taragin MI, Willett LR, Wilczek AP, Trout R,
financial incentives by withholding necessary treatment.18

Carson JL. The influence of standard of care and severity
of injury on the resolution of medical malpractice claims.
Ann Intern Med 1992;117:780-784.

14. Localio AR, Lawthers AG, Brennan TA,
Laird NM, Hebert LE, Peterson LM, et al. Relation
between
I am grateful for the contributions of Judith
L. malpractice claims and adverse events due to
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